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L. Introduction1
In the last decade, the economic theory of choice under uncertainty has gane from ane of
the most settled branches of economics to ane of the most unsettled. Although the debate
encompasses several topics, it revolves around a single issue: the continued supremacy of
the classical "expected utilty" model of individual choice under uncertainty, in light of the
growingevidence that individuals do not maximize expected utility and the development of
a number of alternative "non-expected utility" models of individual decision making
(Machina, 1989, page 1622).
The theme of this paper2 is individual decision making under uncertainty or risk3,
i.e. choIce in situations where the consequence of a particular choIce is not one,
single certain outcome, but rather a set of different outcomes. The focus is on
expected utility (EU) theory, where chapter 2 gives a presentation of the theory.
Chapter 3 reviews some of the criticism of the EU approach. Sorne alternative
theories, generally known as non-expected utility rnodels, are reviewed in chapter
4.
Table 1 gives a brief account of sorne of the major developments in the theory of
individual choIce under uncertainty, and the discussion in this paper wil follow
this table. One re as on for us ing the EU-theory as our point of departure is that the
theory has been the major paradigm in individual decision making under
uncertainty since World War Il (Schoemaker, 1982). It has had a number of
applications to real life situations. 20 years ago it was considered as one of the
success stories of economIc analysis, with solid axiomatic foundations, important
This paper was originally prepared for a PhD course in microeconomics at the Norwegian
School of Economics and Business Administration (NHH). It is also part of a study on risk and
peasant behaviour and incentives related to natural resource use in developing countries. This
paper gives an overview of the standard expected utilty theory and same alternative
approaches. It do es not place the discussion in the context of agricultural decision making in
developing countries, which wil be done in a later paper. To those interested, a standard
reference on agricultural decision making and risk in general is Anderson et aL. (1977), whereas
Cashdan (1990) and Roumasset (1976) provide good overviews with specia1 reference to
developing countries.
2 I wou1d like to thank Kåre P. Hagen of NHH and Ussif Rashid Sumaila at CMI for constructive
comments and suggestions that have improved the paper. The responsibilty for any remaining
errors is, of course, mine.
The terms "risk" and "uncertainty" are aften us ed synonymously. The most common distinction,
which is due to Frank Knight (1921), is to let risk refer to a situation where alternative
outcomes exist with known probabilities, whereas uncertainty refers to a situation where the
probabilities are unknown. Knight emphasised the measurability of the probabilties in making
the distinction, rather than the extent to which they are known to the decision maker. In most
of the more recent literature, this distinction is not made, and the terms are thus used
synonymously throughout this paper. In the Knight sense, we are, however, main1y discussing
individual choice under risk, not uncertainty.
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Theory Critique
1. Expected value EXi = Li Pi Xi St. Petersbourg Paradox
a. Objective probabilities
(Bernoulli, 1738; von Neumann
and Morgenstern, 1944)
Allais paradox (common
consequence effect)
Common ratio effect
Isolation effect
Preference reversal
Context/framing effect
2. Expected utility EU(X¡)= LPi u(x¡)
b. Subjective probabilities
(Savage, 1954)
3. Non-expected utility
a. Generalized expected utility
- omitting independence axiom
(Machina, 1982 and others)
b. Regret theory
- omitting transitivity axiorn
(Loomes and Sugden, 1982)
Table 1: Developments in the theory of individual choice under uncertainty.
breakthroughs have been made in the analysis of risk, and could provide one of
the theoretical building blocks for the newly emerging "information revolution".
The situation has changed, and according to Machina (1987), "today choIce under
uncertainty is a field in flux: the standard theory is challenged on several grounds
both within and outside economics" (page 121).
A few notes should be made on issues not touched upon in this paper. First, we
shall limit the discussion to single-person decision making problems under
exogenous uncertainty. This means we do not enter into, for exarnple, the growing
fie1d of principal-agent theory, or issues of market generated uncertainty. Second,
we do not explicitly discuss the subjective utility theory, but assurne throughout
the paper that the decision maker has information on the objective probabilities of
the different outcomes. There is a separate school of thought, the post Keynesian
perspective (Davidson, 1991), which regards the use of probability theory as of
limited usefulness, because most real-world situations are "true" uncertainties, in
the Knight sense (see footnote 1).
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2. The expected utility (ED) theory
2.1 Background - the St. Petersburg paradox
The mathematIcal form of the expected utility theory goes back to Daniel
Bernoull (1738), who sought to explain the St. Petersburg paradox. This paradox,
which was formulated by Daniels cousin Nicholas 10 years earlier, goes as
follows:
y ou are offered to participate in a gamble, where a fair coin is tossed until it comes up
heads. Y ou are paid $1 if it happens on the first toss, $2 if it takes two tosses to land on
the head, $4 for three tasses, $8 for four, etc. How much would you be wiling to pay to
participate in this gamble?
The expected value (EV) of the gamble is:
EV = $1 * (1/2) + $2 * (1/4) + $4 * (1/8) + ..... = 1/2 + 1/2 + 1/2 + .... = +00
The paradox is that people wil be wiling to pay only a limited amount to enter
the game, and below its expected value. The formulation of EV may be
unrealistic, but the essence of the argument holds if one agrees to limit the gamble
to a finite number of tosses.
The hypothesis put forward by Daniel Bernoull was that people did not evaluate
garnes according to (and did not maximize) expected net value, but rather expected
utility. This theory got its more precise formulation by von Neumann and
Morgenstern, as seen in the next section.
2.2 The von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms
We assurne the following situation for the decision maker (DM): We consider one
single good - x, which can be thought of as income or wealth. Xi is the amount
of income the DM wil receive if state i occurs. The individual chooses between
various alternatives or prospects, each of which gives a certain set of probabilities
(p¡) to each state i that occurs. A prospect, P, may be defined as a given income
vector, x = (xi, ...xs)' with an assocIated probability vector, p = (Pl' .., Ps), with Li
Pi = 1, i E (1,s):
P = (p,x)
The entire consequence of any decision is now fully described by a prospect, so
the choice between alternative actions is equivalent to the choIce between
alternative prospects. Different prospects differ in either the probability vector or
the incorne vector, or both. But by including all possible outeornes in a vector X,
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the differences between the prospects rnay be more conveniently described only
by the differences in the probability vector.
There are different sets ofaxioms that may produce the expected utility
hypothesis. Here we shall present two sets ofaxiom; first the set associated with
the original work of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). In fact, the axiorns
developed by them were slightly different from the ones presented here, which
follows the work of Luce and Raiffa (1957). The presentation here is inspired by
the textbook presentation in Gravelle and Rees (1992). The second set, referred to
as the "modern" one, uses some of the original axioms. The modern set is
included because much of the present discussion in the literature refers to this set
ofaxioms. But, first we present the six original axioms of the EU thèory.
Axiom 1: Completeness
Given a choIce between two prospects, Pl and P2, the DM can always state
whether the first is preferred to the second (Pl :- P2), the second to the first (P2 :-
Pl)' or whether he is indifferent between the two (Pl"' P2).
Axiom 2: Transitiveness
The DMs choIce between alternative prospects is transitive. This means that if P l
:- P2 and P2 :- P3, then we should also have Pl :- P3.
Axiom 3: Preference increasing with probability
Suppose two alternative prospects, each with only two different states with the
same income, Xu (upper) and XL (lower), i.e. Xu ~ XL' The probabilty of Xu is Ul
and U2 in the two prospects.
Pl = (ui,xu,XL)
P2 = (u2,Xu,XL)
Then the DM would prefer Pl to P2 if and only if Ul ~ u2' i.e. if the probability to
receive the highest income (xu) is higher with prospect 1. Jf Ul ~ u2, we say that
Pl is stochastically dominating P2.
Axiom 4: Equivalent standard prospects
Assurne we have three different incornes, such that Xu ~ Xl ~ XL' It is then possible
to construet a risky alternative, where Xu and XL are outeornes, such that:
Xl "' Pa = (ui,xu'XL)
Ul wil be unique, i.e. there exists one and only one value of u that makes the DM
indifferent between Xl and the risky prospect. P o is called the equivalent standard
prospect for Xl' Another name for thisaxiom is the continuity axiom.
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Axiom 5: Rational equivalence
First we need to define a compound prospect as a prospect that for at least one of
its outcomes has another prospect, rather than a certain income. To simplify,
consider a compound prospect with only two outcomes, where each outcome is a
standard prospect:
Pc = (p, (ui,xu,XL), (u2,Xu,XL)) = (P,Pi,P2)
There are two ways of gettng the highest income Xu: Either by winning prospect
Pl with a probabilty p, and then get Xu with a probabilty Ul' or by winning Pz
with a probability (1-p) and then Xu with a probability u2. Thus, the overall
probability for winning Xu is ua:
ua = pUi + (1-p)u2
We can now define the rational equivalent prospect of Pc as:
Pr = (ua,xu,xJJ
The axiorn says that Pc"" Pr' The implications of this axiom is that the decision of
the DM is not affected by the two (or more) stage nature of the gamble. He is
rational and able to apply the usual method of combining probabilities to arrive
at the rational equivalent prospect. There is no risk ilusion involved.
Axiom 6: Con text independence
Con sider a set of prospects Pi,...,Pn, where Pj = (p, Xj)' with p and xj as vectors of
probabilities and state-contingent incornes respectively, and j = 1,..,n. Then, for
each state-dependent income, Xjs' we may define an equivalent standard prospect,
Pjs:
Xjs "" Pjs = (ujs,xu'xL)
Xu and XL wil be the highest and lowest income among all Xjs' This determines ujs
as an increasing function of Xjs' In particular, we note that if xjs = xu, then ujs = 1,
and for xjs = XL' ujs = O. For values of xjs between XL and xu' ujs wil be between
O and 1.
ujs = u(xjs) u')-O
Jf all the state dependent incornes are replaced by the equivalent standard prospeet,
we obtain n compound prospects:
Pcj = (p, Pjs)
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where Pjs is a vector of all the equivalent standard prospects for the different states
(s = 1,...,S).
The sixth axiom states that the DM is indifferent between Pj and PCj' i.e. between
a given prospect and a compound prospect forrned by replacing each income value
by its equivalent standard prospect.
The last axiom implies that each of the initial prospects can be transferred to a
compound prospect involving only different probabilities of obtaining the same
standard prospects. Combining this with the fifth axiom, it means that any
prospect can be written as a standard prospect with only two outcomes, Xu and XL:
Pj = (p, Xj) ~ Pcj = (p, Pjs) ~ POj = (uaj,xu,xL)
According to axiom 3, the problem to the DM is now simply to choose the
standard prospect with the highest ua. We can conclude that the DM chooses
among the initial prospects as if he maximizes ua. Jf a particular prospeet, Pk' is
chosen, then we can ca1culate the corresponding value of uak' which wil be larger
than all other ujs corresponding to the other initial prospects. It is a preferenee
index attached to a probability distribution.
The function u(x) above can be called a utility function, as it gives a
representation of the preferenee ordering on all the prospects. This function is not
to be interpreted as a quantity of well-being, but simply as a name for the numbers
which result when we carr out a series of paired comparisons between prospects.
In the more modern presentations of the EU theory, the set ofaxioms underlying
the theory are somewhat different (see for example Sugden, 1987).4 There are
three essential axioms in this presentation: Ordering, continuity and independence:
Axiom (i): Ordering
This is the same axiom as 1 and 2 presented above - the DM should be able to
rank all prospects, and the preferences should be consistent in the way required
by transitivity.
Axiom (ii): Continuity
This is equivalent to axiom 4 above.
4
It may be misleading to caU it "modern", as it was in debates, involving, among others,
Samuelson and Malinvaud, in the 1950s it became clear that the EU theory rested on these
axioms.
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Axiom (iii): Independence
This axiom is related to axiom 5 and 6 above, and may be formulated in different
ways. Consider three prospects, Pl' P2 and P3, with Pl )- Pz' We define two new
prospects, which are a probability mix of Pl and P3, and of P2 and P3, with the
same probability (p) of P3 in each of these two prospects. Then, we must have:
(p, Pl' P3) )- (p, P2, P3)
In other words, the prospect containing P i should be preferred to the one
containing P 2' for any value of p in the range O :: P :: 1. The introduction of a (1-
p) probability for winning the third prospect should not intluence the ranking.
Another name for the independence axiom is independence of irrelevant
alternatives, or substitutability (Kreps, 1990),
2.3 The expected utility function
Given the assumption above, either the "traditional" set ofaxioms or the "modern"
one, the DMs choIce wil now be as to maximize the expected utility as defined
by:
Eu = Li Pi u(x¡) i = 1,...,n
This is the von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. It states that the DM wil
act as if he maximize a weighted average of the uti lit y in the different states of
outcome, where the weights are the probabilities for a state to occur.
Compared to the expected value form (Li Pi x¡), the assumption of linearity in
payoffs has been dropped. A central property of the expected utility function is
that it retains the property of linearities in probabilities. Further, we also note the
independence between preferences and probabilities. We wil return to these
properties in chapter 4.
The utility function is assumed to be at least twice differentiable, with u' )- O. The
sign of u" depend critically on the preferences towards risk, i.e. whether the DM
is a risk lover, risk neutral or risk averter, as discussed below.
Before we proceed, we should also note that the utility function is not unique.
Utility is measured on a cardinal scale, but both the origin and the unit of
measurement are arbitrary. Thus, any positive linear transformation of the utility
function wil give the same ranking of probability distributions:
v(x) = a + b u(x)
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where v(x) is the new utility function, and a and b constants, b ;; O. We note that
the restrIction on valid transformation is stronger than for the standard, ordinal
utility function, where any positive monotonic transformation is valid. The re as on
is that in the case of EU theory the sign of u" is important, and cannot change
during a valid transformation.
2.4 Attitudes towards risk
To further discuss the attitude towards risk, we first de fine the certainty
equivalence of a prospect (xce) as the certain income (p=l) that the DM must get
in order to be indifferent to a given prospect P: xce ~ P. In the case with only two
outcomes we have:
xce ~ Eu = p u(xi) + (l-p) u(x2)
It is customary to distinguish between three different cases, whIch reflects whether
xce is larger, the same as or smaller than Ex (the expected value of x). The most
comronly assumed case is risk aversion. The definition is as follows: Assurne two
prospects with the same expected value, where the first prospect is uncertain and
the second gives a certain income. A risk avers e DM would prefer the certain
income to the uncertain prospect: xce c: Ex. The implications on the sign of u" is
derived in the following way:
Assurne a prospect with only two outcomes Xi and X2.5 The DM may receive a
certain income equa1 to the expected value of x: Ex = pXi + (1-p)x2. Or he may
get the prospect, with a probability of p to get xi and (l-p) to get x2. A risk-
averter would prefer the certain income:
u(p Xl + (l-p) x2) ;; p u(xi) + (l-p) u(x2)
But this is just the definition of a strictly concave function u(x). Thus, in the case
of risk aversion, we have u" c: O. The intuitive interpretation of this result is that
because of decreasing marginal utility with respect to income (this is cardinal
utility theory), the possibility of a loss of a given size is more important than a
gain of the same size. Another way to put it is that a risk averter is unwiling to
take a bet which is fair.6
5 The argument can be generalized to more than two outcomes by applying Jensen's inequality.
6 A fair game is one where the expected (net) value is zero.
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We shall only briefly discuss the two other cases of attitudes towards risk, as there
are strong empirical evidence that risk aversion is the typical case.7 Jf the DM is
a risk-lover or gambler, this would imply that xce :: Ex, and therefore u" :: O. In
the case where the DM is risk neutral, xce = Ex, and u" = O. In this case, the DM
only considers the expected value of the income of the different prospects. In fact,
if we assurne risk neutrality, we do not need a separate theory for choice under
uncertainty, but could simply use the standard theory of individual choice. The
outeornes of the different alternatives would be the expected values rather than the
certain ones, but they would be treated in the same way as certain values.
The existence of risk aversion, and the influence this has on individual decision
making, is a major argument for developing a separate theory for individual choIce
under uncertainty. To apply the theory one needs empirically meaningful measures
of the degree of risk aversion. Arrow (l970) provides two concepts or measures
of risk aversion, though the first was originally introduced by Pratt (l964). The
measures are therefore called the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion:
Absolute risk aversion: RA (x) = - u"(x) / u'(x)
Relative risk aversion: RR (x) = - x u"(x) / u'(x)
One should note that the two measures do not change with a positive linear
transformation of the utility function. The relative risk aversion is the same as the
elasticity of marginal utility, and therefore also invariant to the units of income.
On the size of the two measures, both are positive as u" .. O. Arrow further
assumes:
Increasing relative risk aversion with increasing wealth.
Decreasing absolute risk aversion with increasing wealth.
Decreasing RA implies that a person would be more wiling to accept a risk
prospect as the income increases. This is supported by intuition and empirical
evidence. The case of decreasing RR is not as obvious, and the mathematical
evidence is not unambiguous. Arrow, therefore, conc1udes that "(l) it is broadly
7 The existence of insurance markets is the most frequently used argument for risk aversion as
the normal risk attitude. However, there are situations which do not confirm to this general
assumption. Commonly used examp1es inc1ude gambling and lotteries. Different explanations
have been sought to explain this: Friedman and Savage (1948) showed that it may be
compatible with the expected uti1ity hypothesis to be risk averse for some types of risk, for
example when large amounts are at stake. Further, the introduction of subjective probabilties
may also explain this phenomena - people overestimate their chances of winning. Thirdly, the
excitement of watching the football match on a Saturday afternoon and see whether one wins
or not may be regarded as a good that ane buys by taking part in betting (in addition to the
gamble itself). Finally, alternative thearies have been introduced to explain these phenomena,
as we shall come back to in chapter 4.
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permissible to assurne that relative risk aversion increases with wealth, though
theory does not exclude some fluctuations; (2) if, for simplicity, we wish to
assurne a constant relative risk aversion, the appropriate value is one". For the
technical proof of this, see Arrow (l970, pp. 96-98, and 111).
The main tenets of the EU theory can now be summarized as in table 2 (based on
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979):
1. EU-theorem: Max Eu = Li Pi u(x¡), i = 1,...,n.
2. Asset integration: Xi refer to final assets, not gains and losses.
3. Risk aversion: u" c( O (concavity).
Table 2. Main tenets of EU-theory.
2.5 A graphical presentation of the EU model
The EU model can be presented in an ilustrative way in a triangular8, which
would frame much of the later discussion on violations of the EU theory. Consider
a prospect with three different outcomes, with Xi c( X2 c( X3' with a corresponding
probability vector P = (Pi,P2,P3)' As Pi+P2+P3 = 1, we have P2 = 1 - Pl - P3' With
the three different outcomes given, the utility of that prospect would only depend
on Pl and P3'
V(Pi,P3) = Pi u(xi) + (l-Pi-P3) u(x2) + P3 U(X3)9
Now, we define the indifference curve by setting:
Pl Ul + (l-Pi-P3) U2 + P3 U3 = v*, or
*
Pl (Ul - u2) + P3 (u3 - u2) = v - U2
The slope of the indifference curve is given by:
(dp/dpi)iv=v* = (u2 - Ui)/(U3 - u2) )- O
Theorigin of this graphical presentation seems to be Marschak (1950) and Machina (1982), and
it is therefore of ten labelled the Marschak-Machina triangle.
9 Following standard notation, we use V(.) to denote the utility index assigned to the whole
prospect, and u(.) or Ui to denote the utility of a single outcome.
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The curves are shown in figure 1. The direction of increasing preferences is
northwest, as this leads to stochastically dominating lotteries; the probability of the
higher pay-offs increase as we move north (x3) or west (x2) (cf. the third axiom
- preference increasing with probabilty). Since the equation hol ds for any value
of v*, and Xl' x2 and X3 are fixed, it means that the indifference curves wil be
straight, paralleI lines in the (Pi,P3) diagram. Using the "modern" EU axioms, the
existence of indifference curves is a result of the ordering and continuity axioms,
whereas the property of paralleI lines follows from the independence axiom.
Similarly, we can construet the iso-expected value lines, defined as:
Ex = Pl Xl + P2 X2 + P3 x3 = Pl Xl + (l - Pl - P3)X2 + P3 X3 = x* (constant)
The slope of this curve is given by:
(dp/dpl)lEx=x* = (x2 - Xi)/(X3 - x2) :: O
These curves wil also obviously be straight, paralleI lines. Movements northeast
along an iso-expected value line in the (pi,P3)-diagram implies that the probability
of X2 (P2) decreases, while Pl and P3 increase. In other words, the chances for the
middle income (x2) decreases, whereas the probability of the tail outcomes
increases. Thus, we have an example of mean preserving spreads, or pure
increases in risk (as defined by Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970).
What would the slope of the iso-expected value curve be compared to the
indifferenee curve? If the DM is risk averse, i.e. u(.) is concave, we have by
definition when Xl c: x2 c: x3:
(u2 - Ui)/(X2 - Xl) :: (u3 - U2)/(X3 - x2)
Rewriting this we get:
(u2 - Ui)/(U3 - u2) :: (x2 - Xi)/(X3 - x2)
This inequality says that the indifference curves are steeper than the iso-expected
value curves when the DM is a risk averter. The steeper the indifference curves,
the more risk averse the DM. Similarly, if the DM is a risk lover, the indifferenee
curves would be more flat than the iso-expected value curves, whereas the curves
would be identical in the case of risk neutrality.
From the diagram, we see clearly that a risk averter would prefer any southwest
movements along an iso-expected value line. This would reduce the risk, while the
expected value of the gamble is maintained.
11
p3
Preference direction
Iso-expected value curves
Indifferenee curves
p1
Fig. 1: Expected utility theory in a (p¡,P3)-diagram or Marschak-Machina
triangle.
Jf we observe the preferences around a prospect (that is testing the choice between
prospects with slightly different probabilty vectors), we may construct a local
utility function. Moreover, because the indifferenee curves are straight, paralleI
lines, we know that the slope of all local utility function is the same, and we have
therefore found the global utility function. Thus, the utility function can be
constructed by just observing the preferences locally.
3. Critique of the expected utility (ED) theory
3.1 Alternative interpretations of the EU theory
The EU theory can be interpreted in different ways, based on what is considered
the purpose of the modeL. Thus, in order to access the acceptability of a model,
one first has to clarify what should be the basic objective of the modeL.
Schoemaker (1982) distinguish between four different purposes the EU model can
serve:
1. Descriptive model
This view emphasises the explanatory aspect of the theory, and the importanee of
the realism about the assumptions themselves. The model should describe the way
decisions are taken, inc1uding the manner in which information is processed by the
DM.
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2. Predictive or positivistic model
Realism about the axioms and postulated computational mechanisms are not
important according to this interpretation; what matters is the accuracy of
predIctions (compared to competing models). This view is advocated by Milton
Friedman and others.lO If a theory is able to produce predictions that are in line
with actual behaviour, it does not matter whether the assumptions are right or
wrong. "The proof of the pudding lies in the eating" - and not the recipe. An
additional argument in the case of the EU theory is that the theory can be
developed from different sets of assumptions, of which only one is presented here.
The border line between the descriptive and the predictive views is not sharp.
First, one can argue that a theory with realistie assumptions are more likely to
produce good predictions. Second, the assumptions or axioms themselves are
hypothesis or predIctions about the DM's behaviour.
3. Postdictive model
"The essential premise of the postdIctive EU view is that all observed human
behaviour is optimal (in the EU sense), provided it is modeled in the appropriate
manner. Seeming suboptimalities are explained, ex post facto, by introducing new
considerations (e.g. costs, dimensions, constraints, etc.) that account for the
anomalies, so as to make them optimal" (Shoemaker, 1982, page 539). Any
violations of the EU theory would, under this interpretation be ilusory, because
it may be argued that it is due to improper specification of the model. Under this
interpretation, the optimality of economIc behaviour is a meta-postulate, and any
unexplained behaviour by a model is due to the fact that the model is too simple.
Stigler and Becker (l977) argue that many phenomena that are often interpreted
as departures from optimal economIc behaviour is actually optimal if the models
are expanded slightly. Others would regret this postdictive perspective in
economics, because it has the danger of tautology or circularity: Whatever an
economic agent chooses is optimal, and he chooses what he does because it is
optimaL. Particularly when economics is expanded into new domains, as for
example Gary Becker (1976) does, the tautological nature ofmodels may increase.
(See Scitovsky, 1976, for an elaboration of this view).
Another key concept worth mentioning in this connection is Simons (l955)
"bounded rationality". It is argued that individuals are rational, but not in the
simple way normally assumed in economics. There are important limitations in the
computational and information-processing capabilities, whIch forrns a constraint
on the DMs choIce. Considering the costs of, for example, obtaining more
information, the optimal choIce may be to be approximately optimal (using
"optimal" in the first case as a more general type of optimization, inc1uding all
10 See Friedman (1953).
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relevant aspects, and in the latter case in the way it is defined in the standard EU
theory).
4. Prescriptive or normative model
In the normative interpretation, the EU theory tells us how an economic actor
ought to behave if he is rational (in the way defined by the axioms) and wants to
maximize his own utility. Thus the purpose of the model is prescriptive, I.e. to
improve the decisions.
The main criticism of the EU model is both as a descriptive and predictive modeL.
It is argued that the EU theory is of limited use in understanding, explaining, and
predicting how economic agents make decisions in situations of uncertainty. A
large part of the criticism have been based on "laboratory" experiments, where one
creates gambles to see whether a selected group of people make choices that are
consistent with the EU theory. Experiments in real-lite situations have also been
conducted, extending from financial markets to Las Vegas casinos. Even the use
of laboratory rats, choosing among gambles which involve variations in daily food,
have been tried to test the universality of the EU theory.i
Particular attention has been given to the independence axiom, which may be
considered the strongest of the three axioms in the "modern" set ofaxioms. The
ordering and continuity axiom are paralleI to the axioms used in the standard
theory of individual choice under certainty (consurner theory), and generally
considered more acceptable. We shall in the following sections review some of
these criticisms. The literature on the empirical testing of the EU theory is very
large, and only a very tiny fraction is touche d upon here, and related to some
alternative theories. Excellent surveys are provided in Schoemaker (l982),
Machina (l987), and Appleby and Starmer (1987).
3.2 The Allais paradox or common consequence effect
The Allais (l953) paradox is the best know n example of systematic violations of
linearity in probabilities or the independence axiom. The paradox goes as follows:
y ou have to select between two pairs of gambles; in the first you choose between
Pl and Pz, in the second between P3 and P4, defined as follows:
Pi = (1, 0.5m), i.e. a sure income of $ 500000
P2 = ((0.1, 0.89, 0.01), (2.5m, 0.5m, O))
P3 = ((0.11, 0.89), (Oo5m, O))
P4 = ((0.1, 0.9), (205m, O))
11 See Battalio, Kagel and MacDonald (1985).
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Allais found that the majority of people would prefer Pl to P2, and P4 to P3, which
at a glanee seems to be quite reasonable. In a similar formulation, Kahneman and
Tversky (l979) found that 82 pct. chose P l and only 17 pct. P 3.12 But these
preferences are not consistent with the EU theory: Pl :; P2 implies:
u(005m) :; 0.1 u(2.5m) + 0.89 u(0.5m) + 0.01 u(O), or
u(0.5m) - 0.89 u(0.5m) = 0.11 u(0.5m) :; 0.1 u(2.5m) + 0.01 u(O)
P4 :; P3 implies:
0.11 u(0.5m) + 0.89 u(O) -: 0.1 u(2.5m) + 0.9 u(O), or
0.11 u(0.5m) -: 0.1 u(2.5m) + 0.01 u(O),
which is the opposite of what we found to be the implication of Pl :; P2. Thus,
what seerned to be areasonable choice between the two pairs of prospects, and
what most people actually would choose, is contradicting the logic of the EU
theory.
The Allais paradox or the comron consequence effeci13 can also be ilustrated
using a (Pl ,P3) diagram as done earlier. We note that the different prospects are
variations in the probabilities of winning the three outcomes (O, 0.5m, 205m),
where the corresponding probability vectors are:
Pl = (O, 1, O)
P2 = (0.01, 0.89, 0.1)
P3 = (0.89, 0.11, O)
P4 = (0.9, O, 0.1)
Particularly, we note in the example that the lines between Pl and P2, and between
P3 and P4 are paralleL. As the indifference curves also are paralleI lines, we see
that consistency according to the EU theory implies that the DM choose either P l
and P3, or P2 and P4.
12 Leonard J. Savage, one of the major contributars to the EU theory, had this type of preferences
when first confronted with this example, but conc1uded upon reflection that there were some
errors in his preferences (Savage, 1954). He is an exception, however, as most people do not
change their initial preferences even after the inc on sistenci es in their choices have been
explained. They rather start arguing with the assumptions of the EUA. See Schoemaker (1982,
page 555) for a brief review.
13 This name of the phenomena is due to the common consequences or outcomes of 0.5 in Pl and
Pi, and O in P3 and P4.
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Fig. 2: The Allais paradox or common consequence effect
We note that a set of indifferenee curves that would be consistent with the
behaviour observed must be less steep in the southeast area than in the middle and
northwest part of the triangle.
3.3 The common ratio (or certainty) effect
We shall now consider a second test of the EU model, known as the common ratio
effect (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). The subjects are offered two pair of
prospects:
Pi = (l, 3 000)
P2 = ((0.8, 0.2), (4000, O))
P3 = ((0.25, 0.75), (3 000, O))
P4 = ((0.2, 0.8), (4000, O))
In their experiment, 80 pct. of the subjects chose Pi in the first pair, whereas only
35 pct. preferred P 3 in the second pair. EU theory implies, as can be shown in the
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same way as above, that if Pi ). P2, then P3 ). P4, and vice versa. This violation of
the EU model is known as the common ratio effect. 14
The common consequence effect and the common ratio effect seerns to be closely
related to each other. In both cases, people are attracted to a certain gain (P l)
rather than a gamble with a slightly higher expected value (P2)' But when it comes
to garnes where the chance of winning anything at all is relatively small, people
seem attracted to the gamble with the largest prize (P 4)'
This intuition does not, however, hold for a version of the comron ratio effect,
which was also tested by Kahneman and Tversky. In this prospect we just replace
the gains in the gamble above with a loss of the same amount. The prospects in
this experiment would then be as follows:
Pl = (l, -3 000)
P2 = ((0.8, 0.2), (-4 000, O))
P3 = ((0.25, 0.75), (-3 000, O))
P4 = ((0.2, 0.8), (-4 000, O))
Again, EU theory implies Pl ). P2 and P3 ). P4; or Pl .c P2 and P3 .c P4; or Pl ~ P2
and P 3 ~ P 4' Conducting the experiment, they found that 92 pct. chose P 2' and 42
pct. P4. What is interesting is that people choose a truly unfair gamble, i.e. P2 (Ex2
= -3 200), in preference to a certain one (Exi = -3 000). When it comes to the
second choice, where the chances of loosing anything is relatively small, the
subjects were attracted by the gamble whose worse outcome is less bad, i.e. P3.
Other examples of similar violations of the independence axiom inc1udes the
"Bergen paradox" by Hagen (l979), which is a special case of the common ratio
effect.
A third category of violations of the independence axiom is the "isolation effect"
in two-stage gambles. This is not discussed further here, see Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) for the details of this paradox.
3.4 Preference reversal phenomena
This phenomena, which was first reported by the psychologists LIchtenstein and
Slovic (1971), is another example of violations of the EU modeL. According to the
EU theory, the DM should choose the prospect with the highest certainty
equivalent. This property is also assurned in the non-expected utility model of
14 The name common ratio effect comes from the common ratio between the probabilties in the
two pair of prospects, i.e. 1/0.8 = 0.25/0.2.
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Chew-Fishburn discussed in chapter 4.1. However, in this experiment (see for
example Machina, 1987 for the details), a systematic tendency for violation of this
prediction was found: People chose prospect A in favour of B, even though they
assigned a higher certainty equivalent to B when asked to value the two prospects.
A possible explanation as to why people chose in the way they did is "that choices
among pair of gambles appeared to be influenced primarily by probabilities of
winning and loosing, whereas buying and sellng prices were primarily determined
by the dollar amount that could be won or lost" (Slovic, Fischoff and Lichtenstein,
1983). Thus, this is a case of intransitivity, and may be used as an argument for
the regret theory discussed in chapter 4.2.
3.5 Con text or fram ing effects
Several studies have shown the importance of context of framing of the gamble.
This may significantly affect the actual choices, even though the underlying
prospects are the same. Hershey and Schoemaker (l980) ilustrates this by
presenting the following pair of prospects to a group of people:
Gamble formulation:
Pl: A sure loss of $10.
P2: A 0.01 chance of loosing $1 000
Insurance formulation:
P3: Pay an insurance premium of $10.
P4: Remain exposed to a hazard of loosing $1 000 with a 0.01 chance.
According to EU theory, the gamble and insurance formulation has identical
underlying prospects, but they turn out to be quite different psychologically. 56
pct. preferred Pl and 81 pct. preferred P3. Hershey and Schoemaker further found
that this discrepancy was strongest for probability and loss levels representative
to insurance hazards, i.e. low probabilties and large loss. Further, the insurance
formulation evoked greater risk aversion than the gamble formulation. Possible
explanations on this phenomena is that the different formulations evoke different
social norrns, or that the insurance formulation gives the impression that something
is gained. The problem of context effects is real, but may also be present in other
approaches than EU theory.
4. Alternative approaches to decIsion making under uncertainty
4.1 The fanning out hypothesis and non-expected utility models
The above examples are violations of the assumption of linearity in probabilities
(produced by the independence axiom). It has been shown that all of these
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violations can be characterized in the same way. This has generated the fanning
out hypothesis, i.e. the indifference curves have a pattern like a fan, where the
curves are steeper as we move northwest in the diagram. This was the case of the
Allais paradox in figure 2. The theory discussed in the following is due to
Machina (l982). More easily accessible presentations are found in Machina (l987)
and Sugden (l987); this presentation is based on the latter. This formulation is part
of what is more generally referred to as non-expected utility theory. The Machina
model is also being referred to as the generalized expected utility theories.15
To describe the characteristics of individual behaviour in situations of uncertainty,
we need a non-linear utility function, i.e. one which is not linear in the
probabilties. Machina (l982) discusses the general properties such a nonlinear
utility function - H(x) - should have, where the two most important are:
(l) H(x) should be increasing in x, which ensures that stochastically dominating
distributions are always preferred.16 In the (Pi-P3)-diagram, it means that the
indifference curves should slope upwards.
(2) Let R(x;F) be the Arrow- Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion, where F is
a probability distribution:
R(x;F) = - (82H(x;F)/8x2) 1 (8H(x;F)/8x)
For any two distributions, where Fi stochastically dominates F2, we have R(x;Fi)
~ R(x;F2). This means that as we move towards stochastically dominating
distributions, the degree of (local) risk aversion associated with any given leve! of
wealth is non-decreasing. In the diagram, this implies that as we move north or
west (stochastically dominating distributions), the indifferenee curves wil be
steeper (more risk averse). These properties wil produee the fanning out of the
indifference curves.
A number of mathematical forms of the non-linear utilty function has been
suggested in the literature, see Machina (l987) for some of these. A simple form,
which has proved to be very useful both theoretically and empirica1ly, has been
suggested by Chew (l983) and Fishburn (l983):
V(Pi,..Pn) = Li Pi U(x¡) 1 Li Pi W(X¡)
15 One branch of the non-expected utility theories is the prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979), which is not discussed in this paper.
16 Stochastic dominance (of first order) is defined as follows: Let Z be stochastic income, and F
and G two cumulative distribution tunctions. F is stochastically dominating G if G(Z) ~ F(Z)
for all Z E (Z¡, ZiJ,
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u(.) and w(.) are two different utility functions, of the same kind used in the
standard EU theory. In the special case where w(x¡) = 1, we are back to the
standard EU theory.
An indifference curve in the (Pi,P3)-diagram is defined by V(Pi,PZ,P3) = v*. With
the new functional form, we get:
*(Pl Ul + (l-Pi-P3) U2 + P3 u3) 1 (Pi wl + (l-Pi-P3) Wz + P3 w3) = v
Rearranging this expression, we obtain the following expression:
Pl (-(Ul - u2) + v*(wl - w2)) + P3 (-(u3 - u2) + v*(w3 - w2)) = U2 - v*w2
The slope of the indifference curve is given by:
(dp/dpi)iv=v* = - (-(Ul - u2) + v*(wl - wz)) 1 (-(u3 - u2) + v*(w3 - w2)) ~ O
All variables at the right hand side are constants, so the indifferenee curves are
linear. Further, it can be shown that only two such equations for the indifference
curve, say V(Pi,P2,P3) = v* and V(Pi,PZ,P3) = v**, can be linearly independent.
Thus, the equation for the indifferenee curve defines a set of lines which all
intersect at the same point. To be meaningful, this point must lie outside the
triangle of meaningful prospects (i.e. where O :- Pl + P3 :- 1), as ilustrated in
figure 3. The intersection point is located southwest of the origin.
The intuition behind the fanning out hypothesis is that people systematically
overestimate low probabilty outcomes. Thus, it is consistent with the general
observations on insurance and lotteries, i.e. that people in some situations prefer
to insure themselves against risk (even though the expected value may be negative
due to trans action costs), but in other situations participate in unfair lotteries (i.e.
where the expected value of net gain is negative). Why this is consistent with this
theory is clearly seen from figure 3. A lottery would have a small chanee of
winning the high outcome (P3)' thus we are in the south-east part of the triangle.
Here the indifference curves are relatively flat, and less steep than the iso-expected
value curves. The DM behaves as a risk-lover and may therefore be wiling to
accept an unfair lottery. Similarly, an insurance situation would be located in the
northwest area of the triangle, where the prospects of loosing are relatively small
(Pl)' but the consequences of state 1 very bad for the DM. 
l? The indifference
curves are relatively steep in this region (steeper than the iso-expected value
17 One shou1d notice that we are not in the same triangle for the lottery and insurance situations,
since the outcomes (x¡,x2,x3) have changed.
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Fig. 3: The fanning out hypothesis in a (Pj,p3)-diagram.
curves). This is equivalent to a high degree of risk aversion.18
4.2 Regret theory
The criticism of the independence axiom discussed above has been based on the
interpretations of the EU theory as a descriptive and predictive modeL. How should
these violations of the axiom be interpreted when we use the standard EU model
as a prescriptive or normative model? As Sugden (1987) suggests, "we seem
forced to conc1ude either that ordinary people are irrational or that the
independence axiom is not, after all, a necessary property of rational choice" (page
15). He uses an analogy to consurner theory. Consider three different bundles of
physical goods; p, q and r. It does not follow that if p is preferred to q, then a 50-
50 mix of p and r should be preferred to q and r, because there may be
complementarities between the goods. According to Samuelson (l952), the key
18 We should note that it is more problematic to use the term risk aversion now, because the slope
of the indifference curves is not only determined by u(.) as in the standard EU theory, but also
the decision weights used, i.e. the subjective weights given to the objective probabilties.
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difference between the physical comrodity mixtures and prospects of probability
mixtures, is that the former may be consumed simultaneously, whereas the
prospects in a probability mixture are mutually exclusive. However, the fact that
people violate the independence axiom suggests some complementary effects also
in the case of mutua1ly exc1usive prospects. This is at the psychological leve!,
where for example the disappointment of ending up with an outcome worse than
expected, affects the choice.
Then, we end up with the question of whether disappointment should be part of
a theory of rational choice or not. Loomes and Sugden (l985) suggests that it may,
and they have (among others) developed the regret theory. We shall only briefly
review this theory here.
The basis for the regret theory is that "the utility which you derive from a
particular consequence of one action may be influenced by a consequence of a
diferent action" (Sugden, 1987, page 16). Let Xi be the outcome one gets from the
actual choice taken, and xj be the outcome if one had chosen a different action. Jf
Xi )o Xj' there is some rejoicing involved because one did chose right given that this
particular state occurred. Similarly there is aregret if it turns out that Xi oi Xj'
Suppose there are only two prospects, each with a probability vector p and q,
defines over a vector of consequences x. The prospects are further assumed to be
statistically independent. The utility is indexed according to a modified utility
function, which takes account of re gret or rejoicing: M(xi, Xj)' The chance of
getting Xi and miss xj is Pi%' so the DM would maximize:
LiLjPiqj M(xi, Xj)
A possible form of M(.) suggested by Loomes and Sugden (l982) is
M(xi, x) = C(x¡) + R(C(x¡) - C(x))
where C(.) is the "basic" utility function, and R(.), R' )o O, is a regret-rejoice
function that assigns an increment or decrement of utility, depending on the
difference of "what is" and "what might have been".
We shall not go further into the technical details of this theory. What is surprising,
is the convergenee between the regret theory and the Chew-Fishburn formulation
of the fanning out hypothesis given above. The transitivity or non-transitivity of
preferences is the only real difference between the regret theory and the Chew-
Fishburn formulation of the non-expected utility theory. It means that if we drop
the transitivity axiom (which is a part of the ordering axiom in the modern
version), what we get is the regret theory. For a pro of of this result, see Sugden
(l987, pages 18-22).
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5. Concluding remarks
The success of the EU model is in part due to its simple and general form, and the
bold and testable predictions produced by the model. As this paper has briefly
reviewed, there is strong evidence of systematie violations of the theory.
Schoemaker (l982) conc1udes, after having reviewed a large number of empirical
studies, "that at the individual level EU maximization is more the exception than
the rule" (page 552). He summarizes the failure ofEU theory in three points: First,
people do not structure problems in a holistic way, i.e. they do not evaluate one
alternative independently of the other alternatives in the choice set (cf. regret
theory). Second, people do not process information, and particularly information
on probabilities, according to the EU theory. Specifically, there is a tendency of
overestimation (underestirnation) of desired (undesired) outeornes, and low
probabilities are given higher "decision weights" than their objective value. Third,
the EU theory poorly predicts actual behaviour in laboratory situations. He notes,
however, that there may be exceptions: "For well-structured repetitive tasks, with
important stakes, and well trained decision makers, EU maximization may well
describe the actual decision proeess, e.g. oil driling decisions" (page 552).
Any modifications of the theory wil increase the complexity, and we have the
classical trade-offbetween simplicity, and the quality of the theory as a descriptive
and predictive one. Moreover, the evidence from empirical testing of the EU
theory is not uniform, and a theory compatible with all the evidence is yet to be
developed. The large body of evidence that do not confirm the EU model may,
however, suggest that alternative theories, which seerns to be more consistent with
actually observed behaviour, should get a more prominent place in standard
presentations of the economic theory of individual choice under uncertainty. The
fact that standard graduate microeconomic textbooks like Gravelle and Rees
(l992), Kreps (l990) and Varian (l992) do not inc1ude such theories may indicate
that there is some disagreement about the value of the non-expected utility theories
within the discipline.
Machina (l989) discusses three goals which the non-expected utility theory has to
meet for it to become adopted by economists; an empirical, a theoretical and a
normative goal. The empirical goal is to demonstrate that non-expected utility
models fit data better than the standard EU model. The theoretical goal is to show
that the new models can be used to conduct analysis of standard economic
decisions in situations of uncertainty. Machina c1aims that the non-expected utility
models have been particularly successful in meeting the empirical goal, and are
increasingly meeting the theoretical goal toa. Regarding the normative goal, that
is whether non-expected utility models should be used for normative purposes,
there is astrong hesitation within mainstream economics to accept departures from
the standard EU model. It is generally c1aimed that individuals that are non-
expected utility maximizers may be subject to systematic manipulation and
23
_______~______.
I
exploitation. For example, the re gret theory does not make use of the transitivity
axiom. An individual with intransitive preferences "wil get eaten alive by a
simple "money pump" argument" (page 1623). Similar arguments can be raised
against omitting the independence axiom, though Machina (l989) raises doubts
about the validity of these arguments. He tries to make a compromise, by
sugge sting that the normative acceptabilty of the independence axiom (or
separability across mutually exc1usive events) may depend on the leve! of
consequence description. At the leve! of description normally used by economists
(monetary outcomes), there are strong normative reasons why preferences may be
nonseparable. At a deeper leve!, where any relevant emotional state is included,
separabilty may be rational.
Stil, we may continue to see some disagreement between those who view
economic analysis as the description and prediction of what is considered rational
economic behaviour (in the EU sense), and those who vie w it as the description
and prediction of observed behaviour. The hesitation to accept models which
describe human behaviour that may be considered irrational from the standard EU
model seerns to be strong within mainstream economics. But the signs of
increasing pluralism in the theories of individual choice under uncertainty indicate
that the discipline, for some time, may have several competing approaches
coexisting.
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